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Abstract
In this paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive
ability. Evidence from a new laboratory study of Chilean high school students shows that
small-stakes risk aversion and short-run discounting are less common among those with higher
standardized test scores, although anomalies persist even among the highest-scoring individuals.
The relationship with test scores does not appear to result from diﬀerences in parental education
or wealth. A laboratory experiment shows that reducing cognitive resources using a “cognitive
load” manipulation tends to exacerbate small-stakes risk aversion, with similar but statistically
weaker eﬀects on short-run impatience. Explicit reasoning about choice seems to reduce the
prevalence of these anomalies, especially among the less skilled. Survey evidence suggests that
the role of cognitive ability may extend to adult behaviors that are related to small-stakes risk
preference and short-run time preference.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent research argues that preference “anomalies,” such as short-term discounting and small-stakes
risk-aversion, are fundamental to a wide range of economic behaviors (e.g., Angeletos et al, 2001;
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Despite intensifying interest in the role of such deviations, surprisingly
little attention has been paid to the question of which economic agents are most susceptible to these
biases. Understanding this heterogeneity is an important step in applying insights from psychology
to markets, because in real-world markets, not all decision-makers carry the same weight (Friedman,
1953).1
In this paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cogni-
tive ability. We approach this question both by testing whether cross-sectional variation in cogni-
tive skills predicts variation in expressed preferences, and by studying the eﬀects of experimental
manipulations that vary the extent to which cognitive resources are deployed in making choices.
Combining these two approaches allows us to measure the extent of heterogeneity in preferences
directly, and to make some progress towards understanding the cognitive processes that generate
that heterogeneity.
To measure the cross-sectional relationship between anomalous preferences and cognitive skills,
we conducted a laboratory study of the small-stakes risk preferences and short-run time prefer-
ences of seniors in a Chilean high school, whose standardized test scores are representative of the
top half of the national test-taking distribution. We ﬁnd that higher cognitive ability–especially
mathematical ability–is predictive of much lower levels of small-stakes risk aversion and short-run
impatience. For example, we calculate that a one-standard-deviation increase in measured math-
ematical ability is associated with an increase of about 8 percentage points in the probability of
behaving in a risk-neutral fashion over small stakes (as against a mean probability of about 10%)
and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the probability of behaving patiently over short-
run trade-oﬀs (with a mean of about 28%). Nonetheless, we ﬁnd substantial levels of preference
anomalies even among the most cognitively able individuals.
Evidence from a second laboratory study of Chilean high school seniors shows that the relation-
ship between cognitive ability and patience is speciﬁc to intertemporal choices between immediate
and delayed rewards, and is not present when we measure time preference using choices between
two rewards that come with a signiﬁcant delay. This ﬁnding is especially interesting in light of
1For example, the market for payday lending and check-cashing is especially sensitive to the biases of those with
limited assets (Caskey, 1994; Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shaﬁr, 2004), whereas the behavior of aggregate savings is
disproportionately sensitive to the biases of those with substantial wealth (Saez and Kopczuk, 2004).
2recent evidence that these two types of time preference are governed by separate neural systems,
with the prefrontal and parietal cortices (which are the brain regions that appear to mediate the
inﬂuence of general cognitive ability on behavior)2 more often involved in choices between delayed
rewards (McClure et al, 2004).
The data from the second study also contain a set of measures of parental education, wealth,
and income, allowing us to test for a role of socioeconomic status in determining preferences. These
variables have only a weak and fairly unsystematic relationship with measured preferences, and our
main conclusions are robust to including them as controls. In a subsample for which we have
data on the preferences of siblings, our ﬁndings are too imprecise to draw any conclusions about
the within-family relationship between preferences and cognitive ability. We do show, however,
that there is very little relationship among siblings’ preferences, suggesting that family background
factors are unlikely to explain a signiﬁcant share of the variation in these preferences.
In a ﬁnal laboratory study, we test directly for a causal eﬀect of cognitive resources on mea-
sured preferences, by subjecting participants to a cognitive load manipulation designed to decrease
working memory (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Gilbert and Silvera, 1996). The cognitive load
manipulation caused a statistically signiﬁcant increase in one of our two measures of small-stakes
risk aversion, as well as statistically insigniﬁcant increases in all of our other measures of preference
anomalies.
We also attempted to increase the use of higher-order cognitive processes by conducting a
manipulation in which we asked participants to think about and express the reasons for their
choices (Wilson and Schooler, 1991). Requiring additional reasoning tended to reduce anomalous
behavior, especially among those with low measured cognitive ability.
The results from our three studies are largely consistent with “two-systems” models of decision-
making (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005; Fudenberg and Levine,
2006; Brocas and Carillo 2005), which posit that cognitive resources are needed to override impulsive
instincts.3 Only our ﬁnding that selﬁsh behavior in a Dictator Game is positively related to
cognitive ability (in study 2) stands out as inconsistent with the two-systems framework, and this
correlation is relatively less robust than the other relationships between preferences and ability that
we document. Moreover, we argue in the paper that other interpretations of our ﬁndings–such
as reverse causality (from preferences to skills) and diﬀerences in pure computational skill–are
2See Gray, Chabris, and Braver, 2003.
3While our ﬁnding that cognitive load tends to increase selﬁsh behavior is consistent with the predictions of these
models, our ﬁnding that more cognitively able indiv i d u a l st e n dt oe x h i b i tg r e a t e rs e l ﬁshness seems more diﬃcult to
reconcile. However, this correlation is less statistically robust than those we estimate ﬁnd for risk and time preferences.
3unlikely to provide a complete explanation for our results.
As a ﬁrst look at whether our results extend beyond the laboratory, we present evidence from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) on the relationship between cognitive
ability (as measured by standardized test scores) and a set of real-world behaviors–low levels of
asset accumulation, obesity, smoking, and low levels of ﬁnancial market participation–that have
been argued to arise from some form of small-stakes risk aversion or short-run impatience.4 In all
cases, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between cognitive ability and the presence of the anomalous
behavior, with mathematical ability playing an especially important role. These relationships
survive extensive controls for income, as well as family ﬁxed eﬀects, which we implement by taking
advantage of the presence of sibling groups in the NLSY.5
Our ﬁnding that cognitive ability is correlated with measured preferences (and associated be-
havioral outcomes) relates to a large literature in cognitive science on the correlates of cognitive
ability (see Jensen, 1998, for a review). In the paper most closely related to our own, Frederick
(2005) has independently shown that performance on a range of cognitive tests correlates nega-
tively with impatience and risk-aversion. We are aware of some other existing work examining the
relationship between cognitive ability and impatience (Melikian, 1959; Funder and Block, 1989;
Shoda, Mischel, and Peake, 1990; Parker and Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Bettinger and Slonim, 2005; Kirby,
Winston, and Santiesteban, 2005), and one paper that studies a relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and dictator game giving (Brandstätter and Güth, 2002), but no other research that addresses
the relationship between cognitive ability and risk-aversion.6 Our work diﬀers from these existing
papers primarily in addressing possible confounds from family background and reverse causality
from preferences to cognitive skills, distinguishing among discounting at diﬀerent horizons, and
taking steps toward identifying causal mechanisms.7
More broadly, our evidence on the heterogeneity in anomalous preferences relates to recent
economic research into individual diﬀerences in decision-making skills and strategies (see, e.g.,
Lillard and Willis, 2001; Kézdi and Willis, 2002; Bernheim, Garrett and Maki, 2001; Ameriks,
Caplin and Leahy, 2003; and Lusardi, 2003). A growing experimental literature argues that the
4For examples of alternative possible determinants of these behaviors, see Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002); Becker,
Grossman and Murphy (1994); and Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002).
5See also, for example, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) for evidence on the cognitive and non-cognitive
determinants of adult behaviors.
6Donkers, Melenberg, and Van Soest (2001) ﬁnd that risk-aversion is negatively correlated with education (in
hypothetical choices). There is some evidence that complexity of a choice problem inﬂuences expressed risk preference,
suggesting that cognitive limitations may play a role in risk-taking behavior (Huck and Weizsäcker, 1999).
7A separate but related psychological literature argues that individuals with greater cognitive skills display fewer
biases in judgment and decision-making (such as the sunk-cost fallacy, gain-loss framing, and the conjunction fallacy)
in hypothetical choice scenarios (Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich and West, 1998)
4presence of heterogeneity aﬀects the potential for sorting into activities, which in turn may either
attenuate or exacerbate the role of biases in the marketplace (see, e.g., Haigh and List, 2005; Lazear,
Malmendier and Weber, 2004).
Finally, our experimental results on the eﬀects of cognitive resources on decision making relate
to a growing empirical (e.g., McClure et al, 2004; Breiter et al, 2001; Shiv et al, 2005; Chakravarty
et al, 2005) and theoretical (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005;
Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Brocas and Carillo 2005) literature on the cognitive and emotional
foundations of economic preferences. The results of our cognitive load manipulation relate most
closely to the work of Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2002) and Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999), who
show that cognitive load increases impulsive behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the results from
our two studies of Chilean high school seniors. Section 4 analyzes the results from our experimental
study of Chilean high school juniors. Section 5 presents survey evidence on the relationship between
cognitive ability and adult behaviors. Section 6 concludes.
2 Evidence on Preferences and Cognitive Ability
In this section, we ask whether small-stakes risk aversion and short-run time preference are less
common among individuals with greater measured cognitive ability. Using data from a laboratory
study of Chilean high school seniors, we show that individuals with greater measured cognitive
ability are more likely to be risk-neutral over small stakes and patient over short time horizons.
We further show that preferences are much more strongly related to mathematical than to verbal
ability, and that diﬀerences in cognitive ability arising in elementary school play a more important
role than those arising between elementary school and high school. Finally, we argue that diﬀerences
in gender or area of residence do not explain our results.
2.1 Study 1: Chilean High School Seniors
2.1.1 Participants
Participants were students at a semi-private high school in Santiago, Chile. The participants were
the 92 out of 160 members of the senior class (during academic year 2004-05) who submitted the
parental consent forms necessary for participation in the study. Most participants entered the
school for kindergarten at age 4 or 5. Some students were admitted because older siblings had
attended, but most were admitted on the basis of adequate performance on an entry exam. Most
5students (more than 80%) had received their entire formal education at the school. Therefore, these
participants had had a similar schooling experience. None had received any formal schooling in
economics. We held a single 30-minute experimental session on August 24, 2004, with participants
sitting in widely-separated desks in the school gym.
2.1.2 Measured Cognitive Ability
In cognitive science, “general cognitive ability” (or g) refers to the most important common factor
(as derived from factor analysis) underlying performance on a range of cognitive tests (Jensen,
1998). A variety of “intelligence tests” have been devised to measure general cognitive ability and
assess its correlation with behaviors and outcomes. Although it is about 50% heritable (Plomin
et al., 2001), general cognitive ability is also inﬂuenced by education and other life experiences
(e.g., Cascio and Lewis, 2005). Many common measures of academic achievement largely pick up
general cognitive ability, even though they also reﬂect personality traits such as conscientiousness
(e.g., Paunonen and Ashton, 2001). For example, grades in elementary school can proxy for general
cognitive ability, with a correlation coeﬃcient around 0.70 (Jensen, 1998). Scholastic Assessment
Test (SAT I) scores correlate greater than 0.80 with measures of general cognitive ability, with most
of the association apparently driven by the math section of the SAT I (Frey and Detterman, 2004).
In our studies, we measure cognitive ability with standardized test scores and school grades.
At the end of their senior year, Chilean high school students take a national standardized test, the
Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU), which has two obligatory sections–Math and Verbal–
as well as speciﬁc subject-area sections. The math section is very much like the SAT I Math
Section, while the verbal section covers literary concepts, reading comprehension, logical paragraph
organization, and vocabulary. For many Chilean universities, the PSU score together with GPA
are the sole determinants of admission. Because performance on the exam is so important, seniors
at this school take monthly practice tests. We obtained 5 practice test scores (for April through
August, 2004) from the school for each participant. The students’ scores range from the 45th
percentile to the 99th percentile of the test-taking population distribution (Universidad de Chile,
2004), suggesting that our sample provides good coverage of at least the top half of the ability
distribution.8 Our primary measure of cognitive ability for these students will be the average of the
8Among all seniors enrolled in non-vocational schools, 31.5 percent take the PSU exam (see
<http://www.demre.cl/estadisticas.htm>). For comparison, the 1.4 million students in the class of 2003 who took
the SAT (College Board, 2003) represented about 32.3 percent of total grade 12 enrollment in the U.S (U.S. Census,
2003).
6ﬁve practice exam scores, standardized by the sample standard deviation.9 The school also gave us
grade point averages for grades 1 through 11 for all students participating in our study for whom
such data were available.
The fact that our measures of cognitive ability involves knowledge obtained through schooling
raises the possibility of reverse causality in our estimates, if students’ preferences determine the
extent to which they invest in acquiring cognitive skills. We defer discussion of this issue to section
4.4, where we argue based on several pieces of evidence that this explanation cannot account for
important portions of our ﬁndings.
2.1.3 Measured Risk and Time Preferences
Small-Stakes Risk Preference. We elicited risk preferences with ﬁve questions of the following form
(dollar-equivalents at the then-current exchange rate of 632 pesos/$ are in brackets):
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos [$0.40] for sure.
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get
nothing.
where X was 400, 550, 700, 850, and 1000 pesos [$0.63, $0.87, $1.11, $1.34, and $1.58]. In each
case, (A) is the safe bet, and (B) is the risky bet.
The normative benchmark for decision-making under risk is expected utility theory, with the
utility function deﬁned over wealth (or consumption) levels. In the problems we posed to partici-
pants, any reasonable expected-utility preferences imply perfectly risk-neutral behavior: choosing
t h es a f eb e tf o rX = 400 pesos and choosing the risky bet for all other values of X.F o l l o w i n gR a -
bin (2000), if a participant our study were an expected-utility maximizer, then choosing anything
other than the expected-value-maximizing option would imply that the person would turn down a
gamble that gives a 50% chance of losing $2.50 and a 50% chance of winning an inﬁnite amount of
money!10 (Put another way, an expected-utility maximizer with a constant relative risk-aversion
utility function and lifetime wealth of $100,000 would make this decision only if the coeﬃcient of
9In cases where one or more of the exam scores was missing, we used the mean of the non-missing values of the
practice exam scores. If exam scores for a given student are draws from a distribution with the same mean, this
approach will yield the maximum-likelihood estimate of that mean. In all, 9 of the 92 students were missing one
mathematics score, and one student was missing two mathematics scores. Seven of the 92 students were missing one
verbal exam score, and no students were missing more than one verbal score. Even without missing data, of course,
some measurement error will remain in our estimate of the “population” mean of the student’s exam scores, which,
if anything, will tend to attenuate the relationships we estimate between preferences and cognitive skills.
10To be more precise, if an expected utility maximizer would choose $0.40 for sure over a 50% chance of $0.87 for
all initial wealth levels, then he would turn down a gamble that gives a 50% chance of losing $2.50 and a 50% chance
of winning an inﬁnite amount of money. Even if this behavior were not required at all initial wealth levels, it still
implies an enormous degree of risk aversion over large stakes.
7relative risk-aversion exceeded 35,000!) The reason is that risk-aversion over such small stakes re-
quires non-negligible local concavity that, when extrapolated, leads to extraordinary risk-aversion
over larger stakes. Because this behavior over larger-stakes gambles is obviously implausible, the
risk-averse choice of the safe bet when X = 400 pesos is quantitatively inconsistent with standard
expected utility theory. Making the risk-averse choice of the safe bet when X is larger than 400
pesos implies even more extreme risk-aversion over larger stakes and is therefore even more ques-
tionable.11 Risk-averse behavior in our experiment therefore represents a deviation from standard
expected utility theory, but could be consistent with theories of risk aversion over changes in wealth
(such as Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).12
Although we cannot connect our measure of risk-aversion directly with participants’ market
behavior, there is some evidence to suggest that risk aversion parameters elicited through choice
tasks are related to real-world behaviors. For example, Barsky et al. (1997) ﬁnd that measures of
risk aversion derived from survey responses to hypothetical situations predict risky behaviors such
as smoking, drinking, failing to have insurance, and holding stocks rather than Treasury bills.
Short-Term Time Preference. We measured time preferences with six questions of the form:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos [$0.79] right now.
(B) You get X a week from now.
For the six questions, X was 450, 550, 650, 750, 850, and 950 pesos [$0.71, $0.87, $1.03, $1.19, $1.34,
and $1.50]. Any sensible preferences imply choosing (A) when X = 450; this question diagnoses
whether a participant understands the question and is taking the task seriously. The patient choice
is always (B) for all other values of X.
11The risk-seeking choice of the risky bet for X = 200 pesos is similarly suspect. Even if risk-loving preferences are
considered acceptable over larger stakes, they are inappropriate in this context of small stakes. Assuming a convex
utility function, an argument analogous to Rabin’s (2000) calibration theorem would show that the risk-seeking choice
of the risky bet for X = 200 pesos is quantitatively inconsistent with standard expected utility theory. Such a choice
for an expected-utility maximizer would imply a counterfactual degree of risk-seeking over somewhat larger stakes.
Therefore, we take risk-neutrality as the normative benchmark in our studies.
12In a gamble that involves possible losses, loss aversion interacts with narrow framing–a tendency to view gambles
in isolation from large pre-existing, independent ﬁnancial risks (such as stock market ﬂuctuations)–to exacerbate
risk-aversion (Barberis, Huang and Thaler, 2003; Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 1999). With narrow framing, loss
aversion makes a gamble that involves a potential loss especially unappealing. However, when combined with large
independent gambles, the probability is virtually zero that the gamble at hand will be pivotal in whether the individual
earns a net gain or loss. Whether narrow framing leads to more or less small-stakes risk aversion in gambles like
ours that involve only gains depends on the functional form of the utility function over gains. (For example, with
CARA utility over gains, narrow framing does not aﬀect risk aversion over gambles that involve only gains.) For that
reason, we do not take a strong stand on whether the preference heterogeneity we measure is due to diﬀerences in the
curvature of the utility function or diﬀerences in the way agents frame risks. Nonetheless, our data provide reason to
doubt that diﬀerences in choice framing play a large role in the diﬀerences in behavior across cognitive ability levels.
For example, there is no detectable covariation between cognitive ability and the diﬀerence between behavior in the
risk-aversion section with gains only and the section with possibility of loss.
8Time-consistent exponential discounting with reasonable parameters requires behaving patiently
in these questions. Under exponential discounting, an impatient choice implies an absurdly high
discount rate. For example, a person indiﬀerent between receiving 500 pesos now and 550 pesos in





≈ 496% per annum!13
Someone who makes the impatient choice for larger values of X is implicitly discounting at an
even higher rate. Such high discount rates imply virtually no regard for the future, which seems
unlikely to be the correct explanation of a participant’s impatient choice in this decision problem.
Although impatient behavior represents a deviation from the normative benchmark of exponential
discounting, it may be consistent with hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Laibson
1997).
Although our approach is a standard laboratory tool for measuring time preference (Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002), there are a number of reasons why questions like those we
use may not actually measure impatience. First, it may be that participants believe that patient
choices are more socially acceptable and therefore more likely to please the experimenter, which
could create a confound if higher ability participants are more motivated to please the experimenter
(List and Levitt, 2005). To minimize this concern, we told participants that “there are no right
or wrong answers...Which choice you make is a matter of personal preference.” Additionally, our
measurement of risk aversion will serve as a partial robustness check against this account, since it
is diﬃcult to imagine why participants would have perceived risky gambles as the more socially
acceptable choice.
Another potential concern is that participants may not trust that they will actually receive the
delayed reward if they make the patient choice. In our study, we promised to pay participants in
cash in a week if they made the patient choice, and in cash the next day if they made the impatient
choice. At the very end of the experimental procedure, we asked them, “Did you believe that you
would actually get paid in a week if you chose to take the money in a week?” Of our 92 participants,
90 said they believed they would get paid in a week. Additionally, the two participants who did
not believe they would receive the money in a week actually had higher-than-average mathematical
ability, suggesting that heterogeneity in trust is not likely to bias our results toward ﬁnding that
more able individuals are more pati e n t .B yd e l i v e r i n gc a s hp a y m e n t si ns c h o o lt op a r t i c i p a n t s ,w e
13Imputing an exact discount rate over utility ﬂows from the individual’s indiﬀerence between the two cash ﬂow
streams requires assumptions about the utility function. However, Arrow (1971) and Rabin (2000) imply that, for
participants with a reasonable amount of lifetime wealth, utility should be approximately linear over the small-stakes
choices we oﬀer. Within the standard model, the discount rate over small cash ﬂows therefore approximates the
discount rate over utility ﬂows.
9minimized transaction costs and equalized them across the patient and impatient choices.14
Most fundamentally, according to economic theory, questions involving monetary rewards should
not measure impatience, since people can (in principle) borrow or lend money at the market rate of
interest regardless of how they discount future utility (Fuchs, 1982). However, in most experiments
like ours, most participants behave much less patiently than the market rate of interest (Freder-
ick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002) either because they are liquidity-constrained or because
they misunderstand that money is fungible. In either case, questions involving monetary rewards
do measure discounting over utility. Consistent with this interpretation, variation in discounting
measured in a manner similar to the one we employ here predicts variation in discounting-related
behaviors such as drug addiction (e.g., Kirby, Petry, and Bickel, 1999; Kirby and Petry, 2004),
cigarette smoking (Fuchs, 1982; Bickel, Odum, and Madden 1999), excessive gambling (Petry and
Casarella, 1999), use of commitment savings devices (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2004), and rapid
exhaustion of food stamps (Shapiro, 2005) (see also Loewenstein, Read, and Baumeister, 2003). Of
course, it is possible that lower ability individuals a r em o r el i k e l yt ob el i q u i d i t y - c o n s t r a i n e da n d
appear to be less patient as a result. We will show later that controlling for parents’ education,
income, and wealth does not meaningfully aﬀect the relationship we estimate between ability and
time preference, which casts doubt on this possibility.
2.1.4 Procedures
After handing out a questionnaire booklet to each participant, an experimenter guided participants
through the questionnaire in unison by reading instructions aloud. The questionnaire was divided
into sections (with neutral labels such as “Choices” and “More Choices”), each of which elicited a
type of preference. The questionnaire contained a section that elicited small-stakes risk preferences,
followed by a section that elicited short-term time preferences, then a small-stakes risk preferences
section that allowed for the possibility of losses, and ﬁnally a section that asked a few demographic
questions.15
Participants were paid in cash for their choices in the risk-preferences sections, as well as paid
a participation fee of 1250 pesos [$2.00], during lunch break the following day. Participants who
14Participants were told that if they missed school on the payment day, their homeroom teacher would hold their
payment envelope until they came to school. Two participants who chose the immediate reward were absent in school
the next day and received their payment the following day. All participants who chose the delayed reward were
present in school when they were paid the next week.
15We discuss the questionnaire in English even though it was administered in Spanish. The questionnaire was
written in English, translated into Spanish by a native Spanish speaker, and back-translated into English by a
diﬀerent native Spanish speaker. The back-translated version closely matched the original.
10chose to be paid “now” in the time-preference section were also paid in cash for that section at the
same time. Participants who chose to be paid “a week from now” in the time-preference section
were paid in cash during lunch break one week after the experiment.
Small-Stakes Risk Preference. The section of the questionnaire that elicited risk preferences
comprised exactly the ﬁve questions described above. To make sure that participants understood
the choices they were making, we gave them an example question in the instructions for these
sections. We also informed participants that they would answer ﬁve questions of the above form.
Finally, we gave participants the opportunity to ask any questions about the instructions. There was
no stated time limit for answering the questions, but we waited about 6 minutes for all participants
to ﬁnish before moving on. We then rolled a die ﬁve times to determine their payment.
The questionnaire contained all ﬁve questions on the same page, with the risk reward X in
ascending order. This presentation made salient to participants the strategy of choosing (A) (the
safe bet) for small X and (B) (the risky bet) for large X.I n f a c t , 70 out of 92 gave monotonic
responses, choosing (A) below some threshold value of X and (B) above it.16
Small-Stakes Risk Preference With Possibility of Loss. This section was the same as the small-
stakes risk preference section, except that each outcome paid 250 pesos less in the second risk
section. That is, (A) paid 0 pesos, and option (B) gave a 50% chance of losing 250 pesos [$0.40]
and a 50% chance of winning X,w h e r eX was 150, 300, 450, 600, and 850 pesos [$0.23, $0.47,
$0.71, $0.94, and $1.18].
Short-Term Time Preference. We measured time preferences with six questions as described
above. For each question, the participant chose between 500 pesos today and X aw e e kf r o mt o d a y .
All six questions were on the same page, with the delayed reward X in ascending order. In the
instructions for this section, the experimenter gave participants an example question, told them that
a die roll would select the question to be implemented, and gave them a chance to ask questions.
Participants took about 6 minutes to answer the six questions. The instructions explained that
participants would receive cash to pay them for this section. The cash would be paid at lunchtime
the next day if the participant had chosen (A) for the relevant question, or at lunchtime in a week
if the participant had chosen (B).
We ordered the questions with the delayed reward X in ascending order to make obvious to
participants the strategy of choosing (A) (the immediate payoﬀ)f o rs m a l lX and (B) (the delayed
payoﬀ)f o rl a r g eX. As it turned out, 87 out of 92 participants chose (A) below some threshold
16In all cases, we present statistical results for the whole sample of subjects but note that our results are substan-
tively unchanged if we restrict attention to only those subjects whose responses were monotonic.
11value of X and (B) above it. The high degree of monotonicity in these choices serves as a check
against the view that behavior in the study was random or unsystematic due to the small stakes
we employed.17 It also suggests that the variation in preferences we measure is not primarily due
to variation in the degree of randomness or inconsistency in participants’ choices.18
Demographics. Participants recorded their age, sex, course of study, and municipality of resi-
dence.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Preferences and Mathematical and Verbal Ability
Column (1) of table 1 presents probit estimates of the eﬀects of mathematical ability on the par-
ticipant’s propensity to display perfect risk-neutrality. Coeﬃcients can be interpreted as marginal
eﬀects evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. We estimate that a one-standard-
deviation increase in measured mathematical ability is associated with an 8 percentage point greater
likelihood of risk-neutrality, a statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀe c tg i v e nt h eb a s er a t eo f
11%.
Existing evidence suggests that verbal exam scores tend to be less closely related to general
cognitive ability than mathematics exam scores (Frey and Detterman, 2004). If the relationship we
observe in column (1) is driven by variation in general cognitive ability, we might therefore expect
verbal scores to be less strongly related to preferences than mathematics scores.
In column (2), we include a measure of verbal ability in the speciﬁcation. Although the two test
score measures are highly correlated (with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.46), there is still enough
independent variation to draw preliminary conclusions about their relative strength in explaining
variation in measured preferences. Indeed, the coeﬃcient on mathematical ability is far larger than
that on verbal ability, and although the two coeﬃcients cannot be distinguished statistically they
are quite diﬀerent economically. Controlling for mathematical ability, an increase of one standard
deviation in verbal ability is estimated to raise the likelihood of risk-neutrality by less than 2
percentage points.19
17In a review of the experimental economics literature, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) ﬁnd that in general variation
in stakes has only a small impact on laboratory behavior. In the case of risk preferences, Holt and Laury (2002)
ﬁnd that increases in stakes tend to increase risk aversion, and that even questions with hypothetical stakes result in
reasonably good estimates of risk preferences.
18In fact, we ﬁnd that more cognitively able participants’ choices are somewhat more monotonic in the case of risk
preference, but that there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between cognitive skills and monotonicity in the
case of risk preferences with the possibility of loss, or in the case of time preference.
19Additional speciﬁcations (not reported) show that the univariate relationship between verbal ability and risk-
neutrality is positive, smaller than the relationship with mathematical ability, and statistically insigniﬁcant, a pattern
12Columns (3) and (4) repeat the speciﬁcations of columns (1) and (2) for our measure of risk-
neutrality in the presence of losses. We ﬁnd a somewhat weaker, but still nontrivial, relationship
with mathematical ability, and again ﬁnd that verbal ability has no relationship with risk-neutrality
after we condition on mathematical ability. In fact, the point estimate suggests a small negative
eﬀect of verbal ability on risk-neutrality in this case, although this coeﬃcient is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Results are similar when we examine the relationship between cognitive ability and patience
in columns (5) and (6). As column (5) shows, there is an economically large and statistically
signiﬁcant positive relationship between mathematical ability and the propensity to act patiently.
A one-standard-deviation increase in mathematical performance raises the propensity to be patient
by 10 percentage points, relative to a base of 28%. The model in column (6) shows that, as with
risk-neutrality, mathematical ability is much more strongly related to measured patience than is
verbal ability. As with risk preference, there is insuﬃcient power to distinguish the coeﬃcients
statistically, but the point estimates indicate an economically much larger eﬀect of mathematical
ability than of verbal ability.20
It is worth noting that cognitive ability not only explains some of the variation in expressed risk
and time preferences but also most of the covariation between them. In our sample, the correlation
between a dummy for perfect patience and a dummy for perfect risk-neutrality is 0.1075. After
regressing both dummy variables on mathematical ability and extracting residuals, the correlation
between the residuals drops to 0.0092. Thus, to the extent that these two preferences are driven by
a common mechanism, cognitive ability seems to explain most of the variance in that mechanism.
2.2.2 Preferences and Performance in Elementary School and High School
The estimates in table 1 show a strong and robust contemporaneous relationship between mathe-
matical ability and two important preference “anomalies.” In table 2, we investigate whether this
correlation is driven primarily by heterogeneity in ability displayed in elementary school, or by
skills accumulated between elementary school and high school.
To study this question, we calculate for each student the mean grade point average (GPA) in
which persists over all measures of preferences in this study.
20Results are similar when we instead estimate ordered probits using as a dependent variable the number of choices
consistent with risk-neutrality or perfect patience. As a further check on the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to functional
form, we have also conducted Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests of the equality of the test score distributions between
those making risk-neutral (or patient) choices and those making risk-averse (or impatient) choices. The results from
this exercise are very similar to those from the probit models we report.
13mathematics over all years in elementary school.21 Among the 85 participants for whom these
data are available, the correlation between the average elementary-school GPA in mathematics and
our measure of current mathematical ability is 0.65 (p<0.0001). Thus elementary school grades
are strongly, but not perfectly, related to cognitive ability as measured in grade 12. To create
a measure of current mathematical ability that is more directly comparable to elementary-school
GPA, we compute for each participant the average mathematics GPA during high school (grades
9 through 11). This measure has a correlation of 0.83 (p<0.0001) with average mathematics
exam score, and therefore seems closely, but not perfectly, related to our key index of mathematical
ability.22 Finally, in a regression framework, practice exam mathematics scores are highly related
to both elementary-school GPA and the change in GPA from elementary to high school, suggesting
that both of these measures index a signiﬁcant amount of real variation in ability.
Column (1) of table 2 shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in elementary-school math-
ematics GPA is associated with a 9 percentage points greater probability of making risk-neutral
choices. This eﬀect is both statistically signiﬁcant and economically large, and comparable in
magnitude to the estimates in table 1.
In column (2) we estimate jointly the relationship between preferences and elementary school
GPAs and the change in GPA between elementary school and high school.23 We can reject the
equality of the two coeﬃcients at the 10 percent level (p =0 .0832), giving us some statistical
conﬁdence in our conclusion that heterogeneity in ability in elementary school matters more for
preference determination than skills acquired between elementary school and high school.
Columns (3) and (4) repeat these speciﬁcations for our measure of risk-neutrality with the
p o t e n t i a lf o rl o s s .H e r e ,w eﬁnd a large but statistically insigniﬁcant relationship with elementary
school GPA, and a smaller though still substantial relationship between risk-neutrality and the
change in grades between elementary school and high school. Overall, these results are statistically
less precise than those in columns (1) and (2), but are consistent with the view that ability as
expressed in elementary school is more important than skills acquired between elementary school
and high school in determining risk preferences.
In columns (5) and (6), we reproduce these speciﬁcations using our patience measure as the
21We follow Wolﬀ, Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein (2002) in deﬁning elementary school to consist of grades 1 through
6. Results are similar when we deﬁne elementary school as consisting of grades 1 through 5.
22Our ﬁndings are similar if we use average test scores as the measure of current mathematical ability, in place of
high school GPAs.
23Note that, because of the linearity of the latent probit variable, the coeﬃcient on the change in GPA between
elementary school and high school is also the coeﬃc i e n to nh i g hs c h o o lG P Aw ew o u l do b t a i ni fw eh a di n c l u d e db o t h
elementary and high school GPAs in the model instead of elementary school GPA and the change in GPA.
14dependent variable. We ﬁnd that elementary school GPA has a large and statistically signiﬁcant
relationship with patience. As with risk-neutrality, the change in GPA from elementary school to
high school has essentially no relationship with patience. We can reject the equality of coeﬃcients
on elementary school GPA and the change in GPA from elementary school to high school at the
10 percent level (p =0 .0729). The ﬁndings in table 2 therefore suggest that diﬀerences in ability
arising before or during elementary school, rather than those resulting from skills acquired between
elementary school and high school, are primarily responsible for the relationship between ability
and preferences estimated in table 1.
2.2.3 The Role of Demographic Variation
The individuals in our sample are similar in age and have mostly been in the same school for
their entire lives; thus many important sources of heterogeneity are not present in this group.
Nevertheless there are some measurable demographic diﬀerences among these students that might
confound the variation in test scores. For example, males on average have much higher math exam
scores in our sample. However, although male students are slightly more likely to be risk-neutral and
patient than female students, these diﬀerences are small and statistically insigniﬁcant according to
a Pearson Chi-squared test (p =0 .239 and p =0 .770 for risk-neutrality and patience, respectively).
Not surprisingly, then, adding a control for gender to our models results in only tiny changes in
coeﬃcients and statistical signiﬁcance.
To measure diﬀerences in neighborhood circumstances, we have also gathered data on the
average income in dollars in the participant’s municipality of residence, as measured from the
2000 Chilean Census. Though crude, this proxy has a statistically signiﬁcant positive correlation
of 0.22 with a participant’s math score (p =0 .03). Nevertheless, we ﬁnd it has a small and
negative correlation with the propensity to be risk-neutral. Including it in our models therefore
tends to increase the estimated relationship with mathematical ability. Individuals from wealthier
municipalities are somewhat more likely to be patient, but including municipal income as a control
does not signiﬁcantly reduce the estimated relationship between patience and math scores. These
ﬁndings indicate that omitted variation in gender and municipality of residence does not drive the
results in table 1.
153 Preferences, Cognitive Ability, and Family Background
The previous section established that small-stakes risk-aversion and short-run impatience are less
prevalent among more cognitively able individuals. In this section, we use data from a second study
of Chilean students to show that heterogeneity in parental education and wealth are unlikely to be
responsible for the relationship between preferences and cognitive ability. We also investigate in
greater detail the dimensions of preferences that are correlated with cognitive ability. In particular,
we show that the relationship between cognitive ability and patience is stronger for trade-oﬀs
between the present and the future than for trade-oﬀs between two future dates. We also document
that greater cognitive ability is associated with greater selﬁshness in a Dictator Game, although
this ﬁnding is somewhat weaker statistically than the relationships we estimate with risk and time
preferences. Finally, we argue using evidence from an “expected value quiz” that diﬀerences in
pure computational skill are unlikely to account for our ﬁndings.
3.1 Study 2: Chilean High School Seniors and their Siblings
3.1.1 Participants
We returned to the same Chilean high school the following year to conduct studies 2 and 3. Partic-
ipants in study 2 were the 81 out of 103 members of the senior class (during academic year 2005-06)
who turned in parental consent forms. We then identiﬁed all siblings of these participants who were
also students at the school. 22 out of 27 siblings turned in parental consent forms and participated.
For the seniors, we held a single 60-minute session in the school gym on November 3. We held two
sessions for the siblings, on December 10 (14 participants) and December 11 (8 participants).
3.1.2 Measured Cognitive Ability
We obtained 11 PSU practice test scores (for March through November, 2005) from the school
for each participant. The school also gave us grade point averages for grades 1 through 11 for all
students participating in our study for whom such data were available.
3.1.3 Procedure
The procedure closely paralleled study 1, except that the questionnaire contained more sections.
The questionnaire presented the sections in the following order: small-stakes risk preferences, short-
term time preferences, fairness preferences, small-stakes risk preferences with equalized complexity,
16calculating expected values, and demographics. As in study 1, in addition to what they earned
during the study, we paid a participation fee of 1200 pesos (about $2.35 at the then-exchange rate
of 510 pesos/$).
Small-Stakes Risk Preference: Safe vs. Risky Options. This section is like the risk preference
section from Study 1, having choices between option (A) (the safe bet) 250 pesos [$0.49], and option
(B) (the risky bet) 0 pesos with probability 50% and X with probability 50%. The only diﬀerence
is that the values of X diﬀered from those in Study 1: 200, 350, 500, 650, and 800 pesos [$0.39,
$0.69, $0.98, $1.27, and $1.57] (in ascending order for half the participants, descending for the other
half). Out of the 81 participants, 65 chose (A) below some threshold value of X and (B) above it.
For each question, a die roll determined the payment for participants who chose option (B).24
Small-Stakes Risk Preference: Risky vs. Risky Options. This section was the same as the above
small-stakes risk preferences section, except that we replaced the sure thing option (A) of 250 pesos
with a low-risk gamble that has the same expected value: “If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get
200 pesos [$0.39]. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get 300 pesos [$0.59].” Option (B) remained
the same. As a result, option (A) is exactly parallel to option (B) in complexity; both make the
payoﬀ depend on the outcome of a die roll.
Calculating Expected Values. In this section, we presented participants with ﬁve questions of
the form,
Please circle whichever number is larger.
(A) 250
(B) (X × 1
2)+( 0× 1
2)
where X took values 200, 350, 650, and 800.25 These values exactly match those in the risk
preference section. Participants were told they would be paid 50 pesos [$0.10] for each correct
answer.
Short-Term Time Preference. We measured time preferences exactly as in study 1. All but one
participant made “monotonic” choices, choosing the immediate reward for values of the delayed
reward below some threshold and the delayed reward for values above it.
24We have checked the relationship between the monotonicity of participants’ choices (i.e., whether they follow
a threshold rule) and our measure of cognitive ability. In the case of comparisons of safe and risky options, we
ﬁnd a marginally statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the two. In the case of short-term time preference,
long-term time preference, and the comparison of two risky options, we ﬁnd a small and statistically insigniﬁcant
relationship. These ﬁndings suggest that our results are not primarily driven by variation in the degree of randomness
or inconsistency in participants’ choices.
25Although we included X =5 0 0in the questionnaire for parallelism, we excluded participants’ answers to this
question from the data analysis since there was no correct answer.
17Long-Term Time Preference. This section gave choices between (A) 500 pesos [$0.98] to be
received “four weeks from now,” and (B) X to be received “ﬁve weeks from now,” where X took
the values 450, 550, 650, 750, 850, and 950 pesos [$0.88, $1.08, $1.27, $1.47, $1.67, $1.86]. Hence
the payoﬀs were exactly the same as in the short-term time preference section, except that they
all occurred four further weeks in the future. A die roll determined which of the six choices was
played out. An experimenter returned to the school four weeks and ﬁve weeks after each session to
pay the participants for their choices.
Fairness Preferences. We measured selﬁsh versus fair-minded preferences with an anonymous
Dictator Game. The experimenter informed participants that we had randomly assigned each of
them to one other participant at the session, but no one would ever ﬁnd out who had been assigned
to whom. The questionnaire explained that the participant was given a total of 200 pesos and could
choose how much to “give away” to the assigned other participant: 0, 50, 100, 150, or 200 pesos
(presented to half the participants in ascending order, half in descending order). As is typical in
Dictator Game experiments, a majority of participants (60.5%) chose either to give away nothing
(behaving “selﬁshly”) or to give away half of the total (behaving “fairly”).
Demographics. As in study 1, we asked participants their age, sex, course of study, and munici-
pality of residence. In addition, on the parent permission form, we asked parents several questions
about socioeconomic status, most importantly family income and the number and make of cars
owned by the household.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Additional Dimensions of Preferences
Table 3 shows the relationship between math scores and choices in a number of preference elicitation
exercises. Columns (1) and (2) present results for risk-neutrality. As column (1) shows, in contrast
to study 1, here we do not ﬁnd that more mathematically skilled individuals make signiﬁcantly
more risk-neutral choices when presented with a choice between safe and risky options. The point
estimate is small and statistically insigniﬁcant. The diﬀerence between the two studies may result
from the inclusion of a greater number of “dominated” gambles (risky gambles with expected value
below the safe choice) in study 2, which tended to reduce the variability in participants’ choices.
Indeed, when we restrict attention to the gamble with the most attractive risky option–a 50 percent
probability of winning 800 pesos versus a sure thing of 250 pesos–we do ﬁnd that students with
higher scores were signiﬁcantly more likely to choose the risky, and higher expected value, option.
18(The coeﬃcient in this case is very similar in magnitude to the analogous estimate from study 1.)
Column (2) shows that those with higher scores were much more likely to make risk-neutral
choices when presented with a choice between two alternative risky options. A one-standard-
deviation increase in math scores is associated with a 13 percentage point greater likelihood of a
risk-neutral choice, which is economically large and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Turning next to intertemporal choices, in column (3) we show estimates of the relationship be-
t w e e nm a t hs c o r e sa n dt h ep r o p e n s i t yt oc h o o s eal a rger delayed payment over a smaller immediate
payment. Here we ﬁnd that a one-standard-deviation increase in math scores is associated with a
9 percentage point increase in the propensity to act patiently, which is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level and comparable in magnitude to the estimate from study 1.
Consistent with the hypothesis of a hyperbolic curvature in the discounting function (Laibson,
1997), comparing the means in columns (3) and (4) shows that participants were more willing to
accept delays from four weeks to ﬁve weeks than to accept delays from the present to one week in
the future (although this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant). Indeed, in a quasi-hyperbolic
model of time preference, the measure in column (3) approximates the short-run discount rate,
whereas the measure in column (4) is more closely related to the long-run or exponential discount
rate. In this sense, it is interesting that column (4) shows no signiﬁcant relationship between math
scores and patience at a four-week horizon. Of course, given the standard errors, we cannot rule out
a relationship of nontrivial size, but it is nevertheless interesting that our point estimates show a
much tighter relationship with discounting in the present than with discounting in the future. This
is true despite the fact that the two patience measures are moderately correlated with one another
(with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.4986, p<0.0001). This ﬁnding may be related to McClure et
al’s (2004) argument that separate neural systems are involved in choices between immediate and
delayed rewards.
The last column of table 3 shows that selﬁsh behavior in a dictator game appears to be more
common among those with higher math scores.26 However, the relationship is only marginally
statistically signiﬁcant, and, as we will see in the next section, appears to be sensitive to the
inclusion of controls.
26To check the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to functional form assumptions, we have also conducted Mann-Whitney
rank-sum tests of the equality of test score distributions for the groups who make patient, risk-neutral, or selﬁsh
choices and those who do not. Results are very similar to the probit models, with the exception that the results for
selﬁshness are not statistically signiﬁcant in the Mann-Whitney tests.
193.2.2 Controls for Parental Education, Income, and Wealth
In table 4, we investigate the role of possible confounds from unmeasured variation in parental
characteristics. We collected three sets of controls. First, we asked each participant to tell us
the highest level of schooling completed by her parents. All but one participant chose to answer
these questions. We have converted each student’s answers into an index of the number of years
of completed schooling. The measures of father’s and mother’s schooling years have correlations
of 0.77 (p =0 .0011)a n d0.67 (p =0 .0001), respectively, with the average report of the students’
siblings (in cases where the student’s sibling participated in our study), suggesting a reasonable
amount of reliability in these measures.
Second, we included in our parental consent form a request for the parent to indicate the
household’s monthly income in terms of a set of income categories, from which we imputed (at the
midpoint of each category) the household’s monthly income in pesos. We standardized this variable
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The parents of 19 participants refused to
answer this question.
Finally, we asked each parent to list the year, make and model of all of the household’s automo-
biles. We used the Tasación Fiscal de Vehículos,27 a Chilean analogue to the Kelley Blue Book, to
estimate the value of each car, from which we computed the household’s total automobile wealth.
When we were unable to estimate the value of an automobile, we imputed its value as the average
value of the other automobiles that the household reported. We computed total automobile wealth
and standardized this variable to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one within the
sample. The parents of 20 participants refused to provide information on their automobiles.
To address the missing data problem, which is especially signiﬁcant with the income and wealth
proxies, we imputed missing data at the sample mean of the non-missing observations. This tech-
nique is obviously imperfect, but robustness checks suggest it does not dramatically aﬀect the
results, and that the point estimates on the controls are similar when we restrict to individuals
with non-missing values. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to control for sev-
eral parental characteristics at once without throwing out the information from variation in the
non-missing variables.
The coeﬃcients on the controls are of intrinsic interest, as they provide information on the
role of parental characteristics in determining the preferences we measure. Although the controls
are correlated with one another, no two control variables have a correlation coeﬃcient above 0.5,
27See <http://www.sii.cl/pagina/actualizada/noticias/tasacion_vehiculos.htm>.
20suggesting that we can reliably separate the eﬀects of these diﬀerent variables. We ﬁnd that
students with more educated fathers are somewhat more likely to be risk-neutral, patient, and
selﬁsh, although only in one case is this eﬀect even marginally signiﬁcant. Students with more
educated mothers are, if anything, slightly less likely to be risk-neutral and patient, and slightly
more likely to be selﬁsh; none of these relationships is statistically signiﬁcant.28 Participants whose
parents report a higher monthly income are less likely to be risk-neutral, patient, and selﬁsh,
whereas those whose parents report greater automobile wealth are more likely to display these
preferences.29
Overall, then, we do not ﬁnd evidence that parental characteristics play an important role in
determining the preferences we measure, after we control for a student’s mathematics score. In no
case is any of the control variables individually statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, and
in no case does a χ2 test reject the null hypothesis that the parental characteristics are unrelated
to measured preferences.30
Given the relatively limited role that parental characteristics seem to play in explaining vari-
ation in measured preferences, it is not surprising that including these controls does not have a
dramatic impact on the estimated relationship with math scores. We continue to ﬁnd a large and
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between math scores and risk-neutrality (in the comparison of
two risky options), and a large relationship with patience (in the comparison of immediate and
delayed rewards) that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The relationship between
selﬁshness and math scores, though still large, is now statistically insigniﬁcant, perhaps indicating
that cognitive ability is more reliably related to risk and time preferences than to other-regarding
preferences.
28To check that the inconsistent signs on the parental education measures are not due simply to collinearity, we
have also estimated speciﬁcations in which we replace these two measures with a single measure of the average
education of the student’s two parents. We continue to ﬁnd no consistent relationship between preferences and
parental education, and the coeﬃcients and statistical signiﬁcance of our cognitive ability measure are essentially the
same as in the speciﬁcation that uses both education measures.
29The inconsistent eﬀects of income and wealth also suggest that variation in liquidity constraints is unlikely to
drive our results on time preference. If our time preference measurement were driven largely by variation in cash on
hand, we would expect greater parental wealth to strongly predict greater patience, which it does not.
30These χ
2 tests, of course, do not aggregate information across the diﬀerent probit models we have estimated. To
check the robustness of our ﬁnding that the controls do not have a statistically signiﬁcant relationship with measured
preferences, we have also estimated our models jointly using a seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962; results
not shown). A joint test of the null hypothesis that the parental characteristics are unrelated to preferences fails
to reject at any conventional level (p =0 .2041), and only the income control is individually statistically signiﬁcant
(p =0 .0260).
213.2.3 Comparisons within Sibling Groups
Although the evidence in table 4 suggests that parental characteristics do not play a major role in
determining the preferences we measure, there may still be unmeasured components of family back-
ground that correlate both with exam performance and expressed preferences, and hence confound
the relationship we estimate between preferences and cognitive ability. To conduct a more stringent
test of the role of this omitted variable, we took advantage of the fact that 21 students in our sample
of seniors had siblings who attended the same high school, thus allowing us to compare preferences
across individuals from the same family. Because we do not have information on practice exam
scores for students below their senior year, we rely on a student’s average mathematics GPA over
her entire tenure in the school as our measure of cognitive ability. This variable has a correlation of
0.8724 (p<0.0001) with average practice PSU mathematics score among the 21 seniors for whom
we have data on siblings, suggesting that it is a reasonably reliable proxy for mathematical ability.
In table 5, we present both ordinary least squares (OLS) and ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates of the
relationship between standardized math grades and expressed preferences. We restrict attention to
t h es a m p l eo fs e n i o r sw h o s es i b l i n g sp a r t i c i p a t e d in our study, as well as the siblings themselves.
Unfortunately, even without including sibling group ﬁxed eﬀects, the standard errors on these
coeﬃcients tend to be quite large, making it diﬃcult to make precise statements about the likely
magnitude of the relationship. This problem worsens when we include sibling group ﬁxed eﬀects,
leading to very large conﬁdence intervals on our ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates.
That said, some potentially informative patterns emerge. First, our point estimates indicate
a positive within-family relationship between math grades and risk-neutrality, and in the case of
safe vs. risky gambles the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The point
estimate for selﬁshness is directionally consistent with the earlier estimates from the full sample,
as is the estimate for long-run patience. Only the negative point estimate for short-run patience
stands out as directionally inconsistent with our hypotheses. Perhaps more importantly, in no
speciﬁcation are we able to reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the sibling group ﬁxed
eﬀects are jointly equal to zero. Although the small number of individuals in each sibling group
result in poorly identiﬁed ﬁxed eﬀects, additional estimates from random eﬀects models support the
view that there is relatively little sibling-group-speciﬁc variation in expressed preferences. We have
also estimated the correlation between a given senior’s preferences and the average preferences of
her siblings. For none of the preferences we measure is there a statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between the two, and the correlation coeﬃcients tend to be quite low. These results are consistent
22with our earlier evidence that parental characteristics do not play a major role in the determination
of the preferences we measure. Our ﬁndings on the whole are therefore relatively unsupportive of
the view that the behaviors we measure are largely determined by family-speciﬁc, as opposed to
individual-speciﬁc characteristics.
3.2.4 The Role of Computational Skill
One possible explanation for our results is that every participant “wanted” to make the risk-
neutral or patient choice, but that some were unable to perform the computations necessary to
determine which option was “correct.” On this view, our estimates merely show that one measure
of mathematical ability is correlated with another. Several pieces of evidence argue against such
an interpretation. First, the computations necessary to make patient choices in the time prefer-
ence exercises involve only ordinal comparisons (greater than, less than, or equal to), which the
students in our sample are clearly capable of making. Of the 81 seniors who participated in the
study, only 3 chose the “dominated” option of 450 pesos in one week rather than 500 today in
the ﬁrst intertemporal choice questionnaire, and only 3 made the analogous choice in the second
intertemporal choice questionnaire.
The computation of expected values is slightly more cumbersome, so to check this possibility
we also asked each participant to make comparisons that involved calculations equivalent to those
necessary to compute the expected values in our risk questionnaires, such as comparing 250 to
(200 × 1
2)+( 0× 1
2).O n l y 5 participants made even one error in the set of ﬁve questions of
this form. Additionally, only 3 students chose the stochastically dominated gamble in our ﬁrst risk
questionnaire, and none chose the stochastically dominated gamble in our second risk questionnaire.
These facts seem diﬃcult to reconcile with the hypothesis that the students in our sample who made
choices inconsistent with patience and risk-neutrality were merely unable to make the necessary
calculations.
4 Evidence on Causal Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate possible explanations for our ﬁnding that more cognitively able
individuals make more patient, risk-neutral decisions. We begin by presenting direct evidence
on the hypothesis that making patient, risk-neutral choices requires the application of cognitive
resources to suppress emotional temptations. We report ﬁndings from a laboratory experiment,
in which we borrow a technique from Shiv and Fedorikhin’s (1999) study of the role of cognitive
23resources in determining impulsivity. “Working memory” is the cognitive system that actively
and consciously attends to, rehearses, and manipulates information. Working memory capacity is
almost perfectly correlated with general cognitive ability (Colom et al., 2004). In our experiment,
we randomly apply a “cognitive load” manipulation that is designed to reduce working memory
capacity. Although the manipulation appears to have been relatively weak, we ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant reduction in risk-neutrality and less precise reductions in short-run patience in response
to cognitive load.
We then turn to another experimental procedure, adapted from Wilson and Schooler’s (1991)
study of instinctive judgment, in which we encourage participants to think about and express the
reasons for their choices. We show that this manipulation led to increased patience and risk-
neutrality, especially among participants with lower measured cognitive ability. This ﬁnding seems
to further support the hypothesis that cognitive resources are required to make patient, risk-neutral
choices.
Next, we interpret the ﬁndings from these two manipulations in light of recent developments in
“two-systems” approaches to decision theory (e.g., Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue, 2005; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Brocas and Carillo 2005) as well as recent evidence
that intertemporal and risk preferences have a strong emotional component (Shiv and Fedorikhin,
1999; Shiv et al, 2005). Although not all of our ﬁndings are fully consistent with a “two-systems”
framework, these approaches do organize the broad patterns in the data quite well.
Lastly, we discuss the possibility that our earlier results are driven by reverse causality from
preferences to accumulated cognitive skills. We argue that this explanation fails to account for
important portions of our ﬁndings.
4.1 Study 3: Chilean High School Juniors
4.1.1 Participants
Participants in study 3 were the 37 out of 108 members of the junior class (during academic year
2005-06) who turned in parental consent forms. We held seven sessions in the school gym that lasted
between 60 and 75 minutes: December 14 (15 participants), December 15 (6 participants), Decem-
ber 16 (5 participants), December 17 (2 participants), December 20 (4 participants), December 21
(4 participants), and December 22 (1 participant).
244.1.2 Measured Cognitive Ability
Because the participants were juniors, they had not taken PSU practice tests. We use grade point
averages for grades 1 through 10 provided by the school.
4.1.3 Procedure
The procedure mirrored study 2, except that we added several new sections to the end of the
questionnaire (in this order): reasons for small-stakes risk preference, reasons for short-term time
preference, and math quiz. Moreover, during half of the sections, participants were put under
cognitive load. In addition to what they earned during the study, we paid a participation fee of
1200 pesos, as before. Here we describe only the sections that are new in study 3.
Reasons for Small-Stakes Risk Preference. In this section, we told participants they would face
the same questions they had answered previously (in the small-stakes risk preferences section). The
diﬀerence was that, after choosing the safe option (A) or the risky option (B) in each question,
participants were required to give reasons for why they made their choice.31 As before, a die roll
for each question determined the payoﬀ to choosing the risky option.
Reasons for Short-Term Time Preference. Participants answered the same questions as in the
short-term time preference but were required to give reasons for why they made their choice.32 We
rolled a die to pick which of the six question would be carried out.
Math Quiz. We administered to participants two 10-minute, six-question quizzes that contained
SAT-like math problems (arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and probability). Participants were told
we would pay them 50 pesos [$0.10] for each correct answer. Half of the participants were under
cognitive load (as described below) during one of the math quizzes, and the other half during the
other math quiz.
Cognitive Load Manipulation. During all of the sections except for the two reasons sections,
about half of the participants were put under cognitive load.33 Speciﬁcally, they were required to
remember a string of seven numbers while they were answering the questions and recall that string
31For example, a respondent who chose the safe option of 250 pesos instead of a 50 percent chance of winning 650
pesos wrote, “It seems safer to me.”
32For example, a respondent who chose to receive 500 pesos immediately instead of receiving 650 pesos in one week
wrote that it was “very little silver to wait one week.”
33Although we do not believe it is a major concern, it is possible that putting participants under cognitive load aﬀects
preferences via “wealth eﬀects.” That is, participants under cognitive load in a given section expect to earn less from
that section, so cognitive load directly could aﬀect the marginal utility of “experimental wealth” if participants frame
payoﬀs narrowly. We therefore counterbalanced the cognitive load manipulation, so that the number of sections under
load was relatively constant across participants. This meant that the negative eﬀect of cognitive load on expected
payoﬀs was relatively constant across participants.
25of numbers (in order) after the section. This is a common “cognitive load” manipulation in the
psychology literature (e.g., Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2003). To
incentivize participants to remember the numbers, participants were paid for their responses in
that section only if they correctly recalled the sequence of numbers.34
4.2 Experimental Results
4.2.1 Eﬀects of the Cognitive Load Manipulation
Our cognitive load manipulation was designed to test the eﬀects of a reduction in cognitive resources
on the preferences we measure. In all, we had 37 participants in this study. In a few cases, some
of the participants failed to answer all of the preference-elicitation sections, presumably because of
the distraction of the cognitive load task. We conduct our analysis on the sample who answered
all the questions, but note that our results are robust to treating non-responders as though they
made the “non-normative” (risk-averse or impatient) choice.
To test for an eﬀect of cognitive load, we have computed Fisher exact p-values of the null
hypothesis that there is no eﬀect of cognitive load on the distribution of the dependent variable.
These tests perform well in small samples and rely only on the random assignment of the treatment
condition. To check that our assignment was indeed uncorrelated with student characteristics, we
also conducted Fisher tests of the relationship between cognitive load and the probability of an
above-average math GPA. In no case can we reject the null that having an above-average GPA is
unrelated to our cognitive load assignment. For a few of the cognitive load manipulations, t-tests
of diﬀerences in mean GPAs show a marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean math GPA between
treated and untreated individuals, but a regression analysis shows very similar results on the eﬀect
of cognitive load when we control ﬂexibly for math GPA.
Table 6 presents the results of our cognitive load manipulation.35 We ﬁnd that cognitive load
reduces the likelihood of risk-neutral choices, although only in the case of risky vs. risky choices
is this reduction statistically signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd nontrivial reductions in short-run patience (im-
mediate vs. delayed reward), but this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. By contrast, the
distribution of patience in the delayed vs. delayed reward case is virtually identical between the
34Due to an error by the local Kinko’s, a page was omitted from some of the copies of two of our questionnaire
versions. As a result, there was a slight imbalance in the number of each version we used, resulting in a slight lack
of balance in the number of participants in the diﬀerent cognitive load conditions.
35We have also checked whether cognitive load aﬀected the consistency of participants’ choices, measured by
whether they follow a threshold rule in the risk and discounting tasks. As in our earlier studies, the vast majority
of participants do follow such a rule. Additionally, there is no economic or statistical diﬀerence in the frequency of
using a threshold rule between participants under cognitive load and those not under load.
26load and no-load conditions, complementing McClure et al’s (2004) ﬁnding that diﬀerent cognitive
processes are involved in decisions about immediate and delayed rewards. The connection with
McClure et al (2004) is especially relevant because the prefrontal and parietal cortices, which are
more often involved in choices between two delayed rewards, are also the brain regions that appear
to mediate the inﬂuence of general cognitive ability on behavior (Gray, Chabris, and Braver, 2003).
In the case of other-regarding preferences, we ﬁnd a statistically insigniﬁcant increase in mea-
sured selﬁshness as a result of the cognitive load manipulation. This result contrasts qualitatively
with our ﬁnding in study 2 that more cognitively able individuals are more selﬁsh, although that
correlation is much less robust statistically than the others that we estimate.
In columns (6) and (7), we report tests of the eﬀect of cognitive load on the participant’s per-
formance on the math quizzes we administered. In both cases, cognitive load reduced performance,
but neither of the reductions is statistically signiﬁcant. Since our quiz clearly required cognitive
resources to complete (there was signiﬁcant heterogeneity in performance), these ﬁndings imply
that our cognitive load manipulation was relatively weak. Our results should therefore be taken
with caution.36
As a ﬁnal caveat to these results, we note that a pilot study using Harvard undergraduates
as participants failed to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of cognitive load on expressed preferences (see
supplemental appendix for details). Because of diﬀerences in sample populations and procedures,
it is impossible to directly compare these ﬁndings, but we mention them here for completeness.
4.2.2 Eﬀects of Additional Reasoning on Stated Preferences
As a second test of the hypothesis that the application of additional cognitive resources will lead to
more risk-neutral and patient behavior, we added modules to the end of our study 3 questionnaire.
These sections asked participants to repeat their earlier decision tasks, but this time to think
about and articulate the reasons for their choices. Among the participants who were not under
cognitive load (in the non-reasoning task), the number of choices consistent with risk-neutrality
(safe vs. risky) increased from the non-reasoning to the reasoning task (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, N =1 3 ,p =0 .2043). The number of choices consistent with perfect patience (immediate
vs. delayed reward) increased to a statistically signiﬁcant degree from the non-reasoning to the
reasoning task (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, N =2 0 ,p=0 .0063).
36We do ﬁnd some negative eﬀects of cognitive load on the math quiz performance of students with above-average
math grades. In general, the eﬀects of cognitive load tend to be somewhat stronger for high-ability students, but
small samples make it diﬃcult to draw precise conclusions about the interaction between ability and cognitive load.
27Table 7 shows how the increase in risk-neutral and patient choices for a given participant is
related to math score. The eﬀect of additional reasoning on expressed preferences was greatest for
those with the lowest measured mathematical ability. In the case of risk-aversion, an additional
standard deviation in math GPA was associated with a reduction of 0.5 in the “gain” from additional
reasoning, which is statistically signiﬁcant and economically large relative to the baseline mean
increase of about 0.3.37 In the case of patience, the point estimate is smaller and statistically
insigniﬁcant, but the point estimate still suggests that lower-ability participants experienced a
greater increase in expressed patience as a result of the reasoning manipulation.
4.3 Discussion
Although not conclusive, the results from these two experimental manipulations suggest that the
application of additional cognitive resources results in more risk-neutral, patient, and (possibly)
selﬁsh behavior. These ﬁndings suggest that the relationship we ﬁnd between preferences and cog-
nitive ability may therefore be due to the application of more cognitive resources to these preference
elicitation tasks among the more cognitively able. This hypothesis ﬁts naturally with recent “two-
systems” models of individual decision making (e.g., Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue, 2005; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Brocas and Carillo 2005). These models treat
decision-making as a result of a strategic interplay between a rational, forward-looking, player and
an impulsive, myopic one.
If greater cognitive ability results in greater strength of the former system relative to the latter,
these models would predict correlations similar to the ones we observe in studies 1 and 2. Since
patience requires suppressing an impulsive desire for immediate gratiﬁcation (Shiv and Fedorikhin,
1999), and since risk-neutrality requires suppressing the fear of an adverse outcome (Shiv et al,
2005), those with greater “system one” resources would be more likely to act patiently and risk-
neutrally. Additionally, if our cognitive load manipulation reduced the strength of the forward-
looking player relative to the myopic player, these models would predict our tentative ﬁnding that
cognitive load reduces measured risk-neutrality and patience.
The most signiﬁcant fact that stands out as inconsistent with these models is the ﬁnding in
37If a participant behaved perfectly risk-neutrally in the initial risk questionnaire (without the reasoning task), then
it would have been impossible for the reasoning manipulation to increase this participant’s measured risk-neutrality.
Because students with higher math grades were more likely to be perfectly risk-neutral in the initial questionnaire,
this raises the concern that our results on the diﬀerential treatment eﬀects between students with high and low math
grades are driven by mechanical “ceiling” eﬀects. However, when we restrict the sample to those who showed at
least some deviation from perfect risk-neutrality in the initial (non-reasoning) questionnaire, we still ﬁnd a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the eﬀect of the reasoning manipulation and the participant’s math
grades.
28study 2 that more cognitively able individuals are more likely to be selﬁsh. Since the impulsive,
short-run player is less likely to be altruistic, a two-systems interpretation of our ﬁndings would
seem to predict, if anything, the opposite relationship. On the other hand, the relationship between
selﬁsh behavior and math grades is statistically fragile in response to the introduction of controls,
and is contradicted by the fact that cognitive load seems, if anything, to reduce the likelihood of
selﬁsh behavior.
4.4 Reverse Causality from Preferences to Cognitive Ability
I nl i g h to fe x t a n te v i d e n c et h a te a r l y - l i f em e a s u r e s of patience predict standardized test scores much
later in life (Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez, 1989; Shoda, Mischel, and Peake, 1990), a natural
alternative explanation for our ﬁndings is that variation in underlying preferences–especially time
preferences–drives both the preferences we measure and our measure of cognitive ability. On this
view, more patient individuals invest more in developing cognitive skills, resulting in the types of
correlations we estimate.
S e v e r a lo fo u rﬁndings suggest that this cannot be the whole story. First, it is not entirely
clear how this hypothesis explains the relationship between cognitive ability and risk preferences.
Second, we show in study 2 that the relationship between cognitive ability and patience is present
only when we measure patience using trade-oﬀs between immediate and delayed rewards, not when
we measure it using trade-oﬀs between two delayed rewards. This ﬁnding seems diﬃcult to resolve
with the reverse-causality model unless only short-run discounting plays a role in human capital
investment. Yet it seems likely that both short-run and long-run discounting would inﬂuence human
capital investment. Third, the reverse-causality model cannot explain our results from study 3 that
experimentally increasing the application of cognitive resources results in choices that more closely
approximate those of our high-ability participants. By contrast, the hypothesis that cognitive
resources have a direct, causal impact on preferences provides a parsimonious explanation of both
the cross-sectional relationship with ability and the eﬀect of the experimental manipulations from
study 3.
Finally, and most directly, in study 1 we found that the most relevant heterogeneity in cognitive
ability arises in elementary school, and that the change in grades from elementary to high school
has almost no relationship with measured preferences. If the cross-sectional relationship is driven
by more patient individuals accumulating skills at a faster rate, then cognitive ability should have
been strongly correlated with skills accumulated between elementary school and high school, con-
29trolling for ability in elementary school. Our contrary ﬁnding casts doubt on the reverse-causality
explanation.38
5 Cognitive Ability and Behavioral Anomalies
The evidence presented thus far shows a strong and robust relationship between standardized exam
performance and the presence of preference anomalies. Based on these ﬁndings, it is natural to
hypothesize a further relationship between cognitive skills and real-world behaviors that are them-
selves a result of these preference anomalies. In this section, we take a ﬁrst look at this question,
and investigate the relationship between measured cognitive ability and a set of behaviors–low lev-
els of asset accumulation, obesity, smoking, and low levels of ﬁnancial market participation–that
have been explicitly connected in the economics literature with either small-stakes risk aversion or
short-term time preference. Even after controlling extensively for income and family background,
we generally ﬁnd a strong and robust relationship between measured ability and the behavior in
question, as we would predict based on our laboratory ﬁndings.
5.1 The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) is compiled from repeated interviews of
a sample of 12,686 Americans. All respondents were between the ages of 14 and 22 in 1979, the
ﬁrst survey year. Interviews were conducted annually through 1994 and biennially thereafter.
In 1980, 94% of survey respondents were administered the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB), which consists of 10 exams designed to measure diﬀerent areas of knowledge
and ability.39 On the basis of each respondent’s ASVAB results, data processors constructed an
approximation to the respondent’s percentile in the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), a
measure developed by the U.S. Department of Defense.40 Each constructed score was then compared
to the overall distribution of scores for respondents age 17 and over to yield a percentile score ranging
from 0.01 to 0.99. This percentile score will serve as our primary measure of cognitive ability in
38To check the robustness of this ﬁnding, we have estimated parallel models for study 2, relating preferences to
elementary-school grades as well as the change in grades from elementary school to high school. We ﬁnd a larger role
for the change in skills than in study 1, but the standard errors are much larger in study 2 (due in part to a smaller
sample), so we cannot rule out diﬀerences of the kind we observe in study 1. Also, our coeﬃcient estimates continue
to point to an important role for elementary school grades, especially in risk and other-regarding preferences.
39These areas are: general science, arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, numerical
operations, coding speed, auto and shop information, mathematics knowledge, mechanical comprehension and elec-
tronics information.
40In particular, for each respondent a score was calculated by summing the raw scores from arithmetic reasoning,
word knowledge, and paragraph comprehension, plus one-half of the score from the numerical operations exam.
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We will also be interested in separating the eﬀects of mathematical and verbal ability. We
have therefore computed a mathematical ability score as the sum of performance on the arithmetic
reasoning, numerical operations, and mathematical knowledge sections of the ASVAB and a verbal
ability score as the sum of performance on the word knowledge and paragraph comprehension
sections.
We will estimate the relationship between AFQT score and our dependent measures–ﬁnancial
market participation, asset accumulation, obesity, and smoking–using linear probability models.42
We have chosen these dependent variables because each has been explicitly connected in the eco-
nomics literature with one of the two preference anomalies we study in the laboratory. We restrict
our dependent measures in this way in order to lessen concerns about bias due to the selective
inclusion or exclusion of behaviors from the set we consider.
Since respondents were at diﬀerent ages when taking the ASVAB, we will include dummies
for age in 1979 in all speciﬁcations. We also include a dummy for gender in all models.43 For all
outcomes measured in multiple years, we include dummies for survey year to control for time trends.
We also adjust standard errors for within-individual correlation in the error structure whenever we
have repeated measures for a given individual.44
As a proxy for human capital wealth, we will control for the log of family income in every
available survey year from 1979 to 2000 (18 years of data in all), with dummies proxying for
missing data.45 Though such controls will not perfectly capture permanent income, the availability
of so many years of data allows for much richer speciﬁcations than would be possible in purely
cross-sectional data.46
41The AFQT score has a correlation of over 0.94 with the ﬁrst principal component of the scores on the ten sections
of the ASVAB, which cognitive psychologists believe to be a good measure of “general cognitive ability.” This principal
component is highly correlated with SAT scores (Frey and Detterman, 2004). SAT scores in turn have a very strong
correlation with scores on a Raven’s Matrices Task, another common tool for measuring general cognitive ability
(Frey and Detterman, 2004).
42We use linear probability models to facilitate including “sibling group” ﬁxed eﬀects. The relationships we docu-
ment are robust to using logit and conditional logit models to estimate the speciﬁcations without sibling ﬁxed eﬀects
and with sibling ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively.
43Controlling for gender does not meaningfully aﬀect our results, since gender and AFQT score are statistically
unrelated in our sample. When we split the sample by gender, in most cases the estimated eﬀect of AFQT score is
similar for male and female respondents.
44Results are virtually identical when we instead average the dependent measure across all years for a given
individual and regress this average on AFQT score.
45To check the role of the assumption that these controls have linear eﬀects on the outcome variables, we have
computed for each respondent an average annual family income, and divided this variable into 20 categories, each
representing ﬁve percentiles of the average income distribution. We have then re-estimated our models using dummies
for these 20 categories in place of our linear log(income) controls. Results are quite similar to the speciﬁcations with
linear controls.
46Controlling for years of schooling is less well motivated conceptually, since presumably some of the eﬀects of
31To account for family background characteristics that may be correlated with cognitive ability,
we will take advantage of the fact that many of the respondents in the NLSY are siblings (53.8%
have at least one sibling who is also a respondent). We will therefore be able to estimate our models
with “sibling group” ﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀerence out family-speciﬁc factors that might be correlated
with both cognitive ability and our dependent measures. To make comparisons across speciﬁcations
more straightforward, we restrict the sample in all cases to respondents with siblings in the NLSY
sample. (Results are nearly identical when we employ the full sample to estimate the speciﬁcations
that do not include sibling group ﬁxed eﬀects.)
5.2 Cognitive Ability and Behavior in the NLSY
Asset accumulation. Bernheim (1991) argues that Americans have anomalously low levels of re-
tirement savings, a phenomenon that Angeletos et al (2001) attribute to short-run impatience. To
measure asset accumulation, we code a dummy equal to one if the respondent said that she would
have “something left over” in response to the following question:
Suppose you [and your spouse] were to sell all of your major possessions (including
your home), turn all of your investments and other assets into cash, and pay all of your
debts. Would you have something left over, break even, or be in debt?
The ﬁrst column of table 8 shows the strong, statistically signiﬁcant, and positive relationship
between AFQT score and the propensity to have positive net assets.47 As speciﬁcation (4) shows,
even within a group of siblings and after controlling for family income from all available survey
years, an additional 10 percentile points of AFQT is associated with an increase of about 1.5
percentage points in the propensity to have positive net assets.48 This is economically nontrivial
schooling work through increased cognitive ability. Nevertheless, all of our results except for the result on smoking
remain statistically strong after controlling for completed years of schooling. In the case of smoking, once we include
income controls, sibling ﬁxed eﬀects, and years of schooling, the point estimate on AFQT score is positive, close to
zero, and statistically insigniﬁcant.
47We have also estimated models with a dependent variable equal to the log of the amount by which the household
would be “ahead” if it liquidated all assets and paid oﬀ all debts. Although this variable seems more likely to be
confounded with income and also does not capture the variation on the margin of having or not having positive
assets, it is still strongly related to AFQT. We estimate a large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of AFQT in every
speciﬁcation except for the speciﬁcation with both income and sibling group ﬁxed eﬀects, where the coeﬃcient is
nontrivial but is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
48Since one might question the wisdom of signiﬁcant saving in early adulthood, we have conﬁrmed that our results
are robust to restricting attention to respondents who are 35 and over. Moreover, it might be argued that standard
economic models prescribe not only more asset accumulation among middle-aged individuals but also less asset
accumulation (or even borrowing) among younger individuals. In fact, when we include an interaction between age
and AFQT score in the regression, the interaction is positive and strongly statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that
higher AFQT respondents are more likely to have the proﬁle of low saving in early adulthood and high saving later
on, in accordance with the prescriptions of life-cycle savings models.
32when compared to the mean of about 66 percent. Moreover, while the introduction of income
controls between speciﬁcations (1) and (2) decreases the estimated relationship with AFQT score
signiﬁcantly, the introduction of sibling group ﬁxed eﬀects in speciﬁcation (4) has a relatively
small impact on the AFQT coeﬃcient despite increasing the R2 of the model from 0.18 to 0.36.
In speciﬁcation (5) we attempt to separate the AFQT coeﬃcient into mathematical and verbal
components. The estimated coeﬃcient on verbal ability is essentially zero, whereas the relationship
with mathematical ability is statistically strong and on the same order of magnitude as the overall
AFQT coeﬃcient.
Smoking. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Gruber and Köszegi (2001) have argued that
short-run impatience plays an important role in the decision to begin smoking and in the diﬃculty
of quitting (see also O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2000). We create a dummy equal to one if the
respondent is a daily smoker, as reported in the answer to the survey question, “Do you now
smoke daily, occasionally, or not at all?” The second column of table 8 presents our estimates
of the relationship between AFQT score and the propensity to smoke regularly. After including
income and sibling group controls, we estimate that an increase of ten percentile points in the
AFQT score is associated with a decrease of about 1.3 percentage points in the probability of
smoking, relative to a baseline of about 26 percent. As with asset accumulation, while including
income controls does reduce the estimated AFQT coeﬃcient considerably, including sibling group
ﬁxed eﬀects has much less impact. Indeed, in this case the coeﬃcient on AFQT actually increases
slightly (in absolute value) between speciﬁcations (2) and (4). In speciﬁcation (5), we report that
the estimated coeﬃcient on mathematical ability is much larger than the coeﬃcient on verbal
ability, consistent with the ﬁndings for asset accumulation.
Obesity. Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003) argue that the rise in obesity in the last several
decades has resulted from an interaction between falling time costs of eating and consumers who
display short-run impatience. In some survey years, NLSY respondents were asked to report their
weight in pounds and their height in inches. We calculate the respondent’s average reported height
and then, for each response to the weight question, we calculate the respondent’s body mass index
(BMI) as the ratio of her weight in kilograms to the square of her height in meters. We then follow
standard practice and deﬁne an obesity dummy equal to one if the respondent’s BMI exceeds 30.
As the third column of table 8 shows, the negative relationship between AFQT score and obesity
becomes statistically insigniﬁcant when we control for sibling group ﬁxed eﬀects in speciﬁcations
(3) and (4). We do, however, estimate a marginally statistically signiﬁcant relationship with math-
ematical ability in speciﬁcation (5), in contrast to a point estimate of about zero on verbal ability.
33The coeﬃcient on mathematical ability implies that an increase of 10 percentile points in mathe-
matical ability reduces the probability of being obese by about half a percentage point (about 16
percent of our sample are obese).
Financial market participation. A large literature on the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott, 1985) documents that “even though stocks appear to be an attractive asset–they have
high average returns and a low covariance with consumption growth–investors appear very un-
willing to hold them” (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Some authors have contended that myopic loss
aversion can explain this reluctance to participate in ﬁnancial markets (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995;
Barberis, Huang and Thaler, 2003). Myopic loss aversion is an elaboration of prospect theory,
which predicts risk aversion over small stakes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
We measure ﬁnancial market participation using respondents’ answers to the following ques-
tion:49
Not counting any individual retirement accounts (IRA or Keogh) 401K or pre-tax
annuities...Do you [or your spouse] have any common stock, preferred stock, stock op-
tions, corporate or government bonds, or mutual funds?
The fourth column of table 8 shows the strong positive relationship between AFQT score and
ﬁnancial market participation. As speciﬁcation (4) shows, even after controlling for sibling group
ﬁxed eﬀects and family income from all survey ye a r s ,w ee s t i m a t et h a ta ni n c r e a s eo f10 percentile
points in AFQT score is associated with an increase of two percentage points in the probability of
owning a ﬁnancial asset, as against a sample mean of about 19 percent. Speciﬁcation (5) shows that
the relationship with math and verbal ability is similar, with the verbal ability coeﬃcient slightly
higher.
Summary.I n a l l c a s e s w e ﬁnd that the AFQT-behavior relationship has the expected sign,
and in all but one case (that of obesity), the estimated coeﬃcient on AFQT score is strongly
statistically and economically signiﬁcant even when we control extensively for income and only
compare individuals within sibling groups. Moreover, we ﬁnd in all but one case (that of ﬁnancial
market participation) that mathematical ability has a stronger relationship with the behavior than
verbal ability, although in general we cannot distinguish the two coeﬃcients statistically.
Each of the behaviors we have examined may be correlated with cognitive ability for separate
reasons. The hypothesis that anomalous preferences provide the common mechanism predicts that
49Myopic loss aversion predicts less investment in equities relative to bonds, so it would be better for our purposes if
this question did not include “corporate or government bonds.” We do not believe this inclusion meaningfully aﬀects
our results.
34cognitive ability should correlate with the common component across the behaviors (Cutler and
Glaeser, 2005). Consistent with this hypothesis, the correlation between cognitive ability and the
ﬁrst principal component of our four dependent variables is 0.53 (p<0.0001).
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper showed that two fundamental deviations from normative decision theory–short-term
discounting and small-stakes risk-aversion–are less common among more cognitively able individ-
uals. Evidence from three laboratory studies indicated that higher cognitive ability is associated
with lower levels of measured short-run discounting and small-stakes risk-aversion. Results from
the NLSY showed that individuals with greater cognitive ability are less likely to display behaviors
that have been associated with these anomalous preferences, even controlling for income and family
ﬁxed-eﬀects.
So who is “behavioral”? We ﬁnd that the more cognitively skilled are less biased. We therefore
conclude that behavioral biases are likely to be especially important in contexts where individuals
with low cognitive ability carry the most weight. Yet we also ﬁnd that the most cognitively
skilled are far from fully normative decision-makers. For example, in our pilot study of Harvard
undergraduates (described in the supplemental appendix to this paper), only 36 percent of those
scoring a perfect 800 on the Math SAT are risk-neutral, and only 67 percent are perfectly patient.
Therefore sorting on cognitive ability alone seems unlikely to completely eliminate the eﬀects of
anomalous preferences.
Our results also suggest additional reasons why the overall returns to cognitive ability may be
underestimated by focusing solely on the labor market returns (Haveman and Wolfe, 1984; Elias,
2004). For example, we calculate that, in a portfolio choice problem, an investor with standard
expected utility preferences would be willing to give up about 5% of lifetime wealth in order to
avoid having her investment decisions made in accordance with myopic loss-aversion.50 Evidence
presented in table 1 suggests that an increase of one standard deviation in measured cognitive
a b i l i t yc o r r e s p o n d st oa6p e r c e n t a g ep o i n td e c r e a s ei nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fl o s sa v e r s i o n . H e n c e ,
if this coeﬃcient can be interpreted as causal, we might conjecture that a one-standard-deviation
increase in cognitive ability is worth about 0.3% of lifetime wealth due to improved portfolio
50We assume a constant coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ρ =5 , an exponential discount rate γ =0 .08,a n d
log-normal portfolio returns in an inﬁnite-horizon model. We use Campbell and Viceira’s (2002, p. 104) estimates of
equity and bond returns and Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) calculation that a loss-averse investor would hold around
40% equities. Details are available from the authors upon request.
35allocation alone.51 Since portfolio choice is only one of many important household decisions that
are aﬀected by cognitive ability, the total value of cognitive ability’s eﬀect on decision-making could
be quite substantial.
Though crude, such calibrations also suggest that our results may have potentially important
policy implications. To the extent that education can increase cognitive ability (Cascio and Lewis,
2005), human capital policy may be an important tool for addressing biases in decision-making in a
wide range of contexts. On the other hand, our ﬁndings on the role of elementary and high school
grades in determining preferences suggest that much of the important heterogeneity in skills may
arise early in life.
Finally, our results suggest that the expression of anomalous preferences may be a mistake
due to cognitive limitations, rather than a manifestation of fundamental desires. This raises the
question of whether social welfare should be evaluated on the basis of the anomalous preferences,
or instead on the preferences an individual would express after further deliberation.
51For comparison, Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001) estimate that a one-standard-deviation increase in cog-
nitive ability corresponds to an increase in wages of 10-16%.
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42Table 1 Preferences and Mathematical and Verbal Ability
Source: Laboratory study 1
Dependent variable Risk neutral (gains) Risk neutral (gain/loss) Patient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standardized math score 0.0776 0.0707 0.0579 0.0676 0.1030 0.0951
(0.0279) (0.0305) (0.0280) (0.0329) (0.0475) (0.0533)
Standardized verbal score 0.0144 -0.0223 0.0172
(0.0313) (0.0343) (0.0546)
Mean of dependent variable 0.1087 0.1087 0.1087 0.1087 0.2826 0.2826
Pseudo-R2 0.1480 0.1513 0.0688 0.0755 0.0444 0.0453
N 92 92 92 92 92 92
Notes: Results are from probit models with coeﬃcients expressed as marginal eﬀects evaluated at the sample
mean of the independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are from study 1 (laboratory study
of Chilean high school seniors). Test scores standardized by the sample standard deviation.
Risk neutral (gains) indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent
with expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos for sure.
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get nothing.
Risk neutral (gain/loss) indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent
with expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 0 pesos for sure.
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you lose 250 pesos.
Patient indicates that participants made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with the
maximization of undiscounted wealth:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos right now.
(B) You get X a week from now.
43Table 2 Preferences and School Performance
Source: Laboratory study 1
Dependent variable Risk neutral (gains) Risk neutral (gain/loss) Patient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standardized math GPA 0.0854 0.0857 0.0500 0.0614 0.1481 0.1525
(elementary school) (0.0326) (0.0339) (0.0359) (0.0369) (0.0560) (0.0592)
High school GPA - 0.0012 0.0436 0.0157
Elementary school GPA (0.0386) (0.0439) (0.0691)
Mean of dependent variable 0.1059 0.1059 0.1059 0.1059 0.2824 0.2824
Pseudo-R2 0.1171 0.1171 0.0343 0.0516 0.0742 0.0747
N 85 85 85 85 85 85
Notes: Results are from probit models with coeﬃcients expressed as marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean
of the independent variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. Data are from study 1 (laboratory study
of Chilean high school seniors). Sample includes only those students for whom elementary school grades
were available. Average GPA in elementary school (grades 1-6) standardized by sample standard deviation.
Average GPA in high school (grades 9-11) standardized by sample standard deviation.
Risk neutral (gains) indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent
with expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos for sure.
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get nothing.
Risk neutral (gain/loss) indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent
with expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 0 pesos for sure.
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you lose 250 pesos.
Patient indicates that participants made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with the
maximization of undiscounted wealth:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos right now.
(B) You get X a week from now.
44Table 3 Preferences and Cognitive Ability
Source: Laboratory study 2
Dependent variable Risk neutral Patient Selﬁsh
Safe vs. Risky vs. Now vs. Four vs.
Risky Risky One week Five weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized math score 0.0134 0.1255 0.0930 0.0121 0.0857
(0.0529) (0.0591) (0.0448) (0.0506) (0.0491)
Mean of dependent variable 0.3333 0.4321 0.2222 0.2963 0.2593
Pseudo-R2 0.0006 0.0429 0.0514 0.0006 0.0343
N 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: Results are from probit models with coeﬃcients expressed as marginal eﬀects evaluated at the sample
mean of the independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are from study 2 (laboratory study
of Chilean high school seniors). Test scores standardized by the sample standard deviation.
Risk neutral indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with
expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos for sure [safe vs. risky]. / If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get 200 pesos. If the
die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get 300 pesos [risky vs. risky].
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get nothing.
Patient indicates that participants made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with the
maximization of undiscounted wealth:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos right now (in four weeks).
(B) You get X a week from now (ﬁve weeks from now).
Selﬁsh indicates that the participant kept all 200 pesos for herself in an exercise in which she could choose
to give part of a 200 peso allocation to an anonymous participant.
45Table 4 Preferences, Cognitive Ability, and Parental Characteristics
Source: Laboratory study 2
Dependent variable Risk neutral Patient Selﬁsh
Safe vs. Risky vs. Now vs. Four vs.
Risky Risky One week Five weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized math score -0.0066 0.1265 0.0791 0.0013 0.0743
(0.0545) (0.0617) (0.0435) (0.0516) (0.0495)
Father’s years of schooling 0.0527 0.0027 0.0087 0.0331 0.0048
(0.0287) (0.0307) (0.0249) (0.0281) (0.0263)
Mother’s years of schooling -0.0175 -0.0240 -0.0021 -0.0100 0.0118
(0.0308) (0.0329) (0.0252) (0.0291) (0.0285)
Monthly income -0.1333 -0.1120 -0.1570 -0.0713 -0.0900
(standardized) (0.0821) (0.0879) (0.0767) (0.0740) (0.0735)
Total value of automobiles 0.1194 0.1304 0.0212 0.0232 0.0371
(standardized) (0.0751) (0.0794) (0.0702) (0.0680) (0.0670)
Mean of dependent variable 0.3333 0.4321 0.2222 0.2963 0.2593
Pseudo-R2 0.0727 0.0429 0.1187 0.0255 0.0526
χ2
4 test of eﬀect of controls 6.81 3.80 4.77 2.37 1.59
(p-value) 0.1463 0.4338 0.3112 0.6672 0.8105
N 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: Results are from probit models with coeﬃcients expressed as marginal eﬀects evaluated at the sample
mean of the independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are from study 2 (laboratory study
of Chilean high school seniors). Test scores standardized by the sample standard deviation. Father’s and
mother’s years of schooling were reported by participants. Monthly income and make and model of automo-
biles were reported by parents; we computed the value of household automobiles from this information. For
all control variables, we impute missing values with the sample mean of the non-missing values.
Risk neutral indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with
expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos for sure [safe vs. risky]. / If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get 200 pesos. If the
die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get 300 pesos [risky vs. risky].
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get nothing.
Patient indicates that participants made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with the
maximization of undiscounted wealth:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos right now (in four weeks).
(B) You get X a week from now (ﬁve weeks from now).
Selﬁsh indicates that the participant kept all 200 pesos for herself in an exercise in which she could choose
to give part of a 200 peso allocation to an anonymous participant.
46Table 5 Comparisons within Sibling Groups
Source: Laboratory study 2
Dependent variable Risk neutral Patient Selﬁsh
Safe vs. Risky vs. Now vs. Four vs.
Risky Risky One week Five weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standardized math grades 0.0657 -0.1031 -0.0045 0.0234 -0.0411
(OLS) (0.0831) (0.0835) (0.0768) (0.0827) (0.0721)
Standardized math grades 0.2174 0.0096 -0.1258 0.0763 0.0290
(Sibling group ﬁxed eﬀects) (0.1215) (0.1489) (0.1003) (0.1371) (0.0988)
Mean of dependent variable 0.3953 0.5581 0.2791 0.3721 0.2326
R2 (OLS) 0.0150 0.0359 0.0001 0.0019 0.0079
R2 (Fixed Eﬀects) 0.5357 0.3243 0.6236 0.3951 0.5891
F(20, 21) on ﬁxed eﬀects 1.177 0.448 1.739 0.682 1.485
(p-value) 0.356 0.961 0.108 0.801 0.188
Number of observations 43 43 43 43 43
Number of sibling groups 21 21 21 21 21
Notes: Results are from probit models with coeﬃcients expressed as marginal eﬀects evaluated at the sample
mean of the independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are from study 2 (laboratory study
of Chilean high school seniors and their siblings). Test scores standardized by the sample standard deviation.
Risk neutral indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with
expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos for sure [safe vs. risky]. / If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get 200 pesos. If the
die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get 300 pesos [risky vs. risky].
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get nothing.
Patient indicates that participants made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with the
maximization of undiscounted wealth:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos right now (in four weeks).
(B) You get X a week from now (ﬁve weeks from now).
Selﬁsh indicates that the participant kept all 200 pesos for herself in an exercise in which she could choose
to give part of a 200 peso allocation to an anonymous participant.
47Table 6 Eﬀects of Cognitive Load on Expressed Preferences
Source: Laboratory study 3
Dependent Risk neutral Patient Selﬁsh Math quiz
variable Safe vs. Risky vs. Now vs. Four vs. One Two
Risky Risky One week Five weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Not under load 0.3077 0.5882 0.2857 0.3333 0.0000 0.1333 0.3182
Under load 0.1429 0.2000 0.1333 0.3158 0.1176 0.0909 0.2000
Fisher exact p-value 0.387 0.021 0.424 1.000 0.204 1.000 0.481
No. of observations 34 37 36 37 37 37 37
No. not under load 13 17 21 18 20 15 22
No. under load 21 20 15 19 17 22 15
Notes: Data are from study 3 (laboratory study of Chilean high school juniors). Cognitive load indicates
that the participant was asked to remember a seven-digit number while performing the task.
Risk neutral indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with
expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos for sure [safe vs. risky]. / If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get 200 pesos. If the
die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get 300 pesos [risky vs. risky].
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get nothing.
Patient indicates that participants made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with the
maximization of undiscounted wealth:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos right now (in four weeks).
(B) You get X a week from now (ﬁve weeks from now).
Selﬁsh indicates that the participant kept all 200 pesos for herself in an exercise in which she could choose
to give part of a 200 peso allocation to an anonymous participant.
Math quiz indicates that the respondent answered all questions correctly in one of two math quizzes.
48Table 7 How Eﬀects of Reasoning on Expressed Preferences Vary With Cognitive Ability
Source: Laboratory study 3
Dependent variable Diﬀerence between reasoning and non-reasoning
task in number of choices consistent with...
Risk-neutrality Patience
(Safe vs. Risky) (Now vs. One Week)
(1) (2)
Standardized math grades -0.5099 -0.1054
(0.1571) (0.2100)





No. of observations 34 34
Notes: Data are from study 3 (laboratory study of Chilean high school juniors). Reasoning task indicates
that the participant was asked to think about and express the reasons for her choice.
Risk neutral indicates that participant made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with
expected-value maximization:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 250 pesos for sure.
(B) If the die comes up 1, 2, or 3, you get X. If the die comes up 4, 5, or 6, you get nothing.
Patient indicates that participants made six decisions of the following form in a way consistent with the
maximization of undiscounted wealth:
Please circle either Choice A or Choice B.
(A) You get 500 pesos right now.
(B) You get X a week from now.
49Table 8 Behavior and Cognitive Ability in the NLSY
Source: NLSY
Dependent variable is dummy for...
Controls Positive net Smoking Obesity Financial market
assets participation
(1) Baseline 0.5420 -0.2566 -0.1362 0.5033
(0.0147) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0185)
R2 =0 .10 R2 =0 .03 R2 =0 .07 R2 =0 .13
(2) Income 0.2013 -0.1146 -0.1014 0.2801
(1979-2000) (0.0179) (0.0244) (0.0162) (0.0233)
R2 =0 .18 R2 =0 .06 R2 =0 .08 R2 =0 .19
(3) Sibling group 0.3416 -0.2180 -0.0280 0.3355
ﬁxed eﬀects (0.0253) (0.0334) (0.0210) (0.0322)
R2 =0 .34 R2 =0 .49 R2 =0 .39 R2 =0 .47
(4) Income 0.1481 -0.1270 -0.0306 0.2200
+ Sibling group (0.0250) (0.0346) (0.0219) (0.0331)
R2 =0 .36 R2 =0 .50 R2 =0 .39 R2 =0 .49
(5) Income
+ Sibling group
Math 0.1740 -0.1296 -0.0422 0.0920
percentile (0.0275) (0.0379) (0.0226) (0.0319)
Verbal 0.0047 -0.0291 0.0082 0.1320
percentile (0.0299) (0.0379) (0.0246) (0.0363)
R2 =0 .37 R2 =0 .50 R2 =0 .39 R2 =0 .49
Mean of dep. var. 0.6544 0.2647 0.1563 0.1938
No. of observations 31608 12980 66663 8386
No. of respondents 5350 4752 5561 4459
No. of sibling groups 2379 2126 2394 2088
Notes: Data from NLSY. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by individual. Samples include
respondents with at least one sibling in NLSY. AFQT score is a percentile ranging from 0.01 to 0.99.
Math score is the sum of performance on the arithmetic reasoning, numerical operations, and mathematical
knowledge sections of the ASVAB, expressed as a percentile in sample distribution. Verbal score is the sum
of performance on the word knowledge and paragraph comprehension sections of the ASVAB, expressed as
a percentile in sample distribution. All speciﬁcations include a dummy for gender, dummies for age in 1979,
and dummies for survey year. Income controls include controls for log of family income for all available
years of data, 1979-1998, with dummies for missing values. Asset accumulation variable available for 1990,
1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Smoking variable available for 1992, 1994, and 1998. Obesity
variable available for 1981, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.
Financial market variable participation available for 1998 and 2000.
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